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Abstract 19 
Common resource dilemmas involve collectively coordinating individual choices to promote 20 
group efficiency. Equal division represents one of the most important coordination rules. 21 
Previous research suggests that individuals follow the equality rule for different reasons. Some 22 
individuals behave cooperatively out of their concern for other’s welfare, whereas some 23 
individuals cooperate strategically to enhance personal gains. Building on the dual-process 24 
perspective, the authors aim to differentiate strategic fairness from true fairness in solving a 25 
resource dilemma. In four experiments, the effect of cognitive processing manipulations on 26 
individual harvesting behavior in a one-shot resource dilemma was tested against participants 27 
with different social values. Results consistently showed that prosocials, who value joint 28 
outcome and equality, requested significantly less money than did proselfs, who value personal 29 
gain. More importantly, prosocials in the intuition and deliberation conditions request similar 30 
amounts, whereas proselfs in the intuition condition request more money than those in the 31 
deliberation condition. The results were further validated by a follow-up meta-analysis based 32 
on the four experiments. The implications of the dual-process perspective for social 33 
coordination research are discussed. 34 
Keywords: coordination, dual-process, equal division, social preferences, social value 35 
orientation 36 
  37 
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A resource dilemma is characterized by a conflict between individual and collective 38 
interests, in which a group of people share a limited resource pool that can be exploited to 39 
maximize personal gain; but if too many overharvest, they risk depleting the common pool 40 
(Dawes, 1980; Hardin, 1968). Overfishing and global energy consumption are examples of the 41 
resource dilemma (for reviews, see Komorita & Parks, 1995; Kopelman, Weber, & Messick, 42 
2002).  43 
Apart from this conflict metaphor, a resource dilemma is also about a collective puzzle 44 
of "how the people involved can efficiently coordinate their decisions" (de Kwaadsteniet & 45 
van Dijk, 2012, p. 190), especially so in almost all problems involving environmental 46 
uncertainty (e.g., Budescu, Rapoport, & Suleiman, 1990; de Kwaadsteniet, van Dijk, Wit, & 47 
de Cremer, 2006; Gustafsson, Biel, & Gärling, 1999; Rapoport, Budescu, Suleiman, & Weg, 48 
1992). A prominent goal thus arises, that is to allocate resource in an efficient way, through 49 
which both individual interests and collective interests can be satisfied (Wilke, 1991). 50 
Therefore, resource dilemmas also involve the element of social coordination (for a review, see 51 
Abele, Stasser, & Chartier, 2010), in which the optimal use of a resource is achieved through 52 
coordinating with others’ choices (de Kwaadsteniet et al., 2006).  53 
As to how people coordinate in resource dilemmas, several scholars point to the role of 54 
fairness which is defined as providing group members with equal final outcomes (de 55 
Kwaadsteniet & van Dijk, 2012; Schelling, 1960; Wilke, 1991). Numerous studies on resource 56 
dilemmas show that people tend to harvest an equal share of the resource (e.g., Allison, 57 
McQueen, & Schaer, 1992; Allison & Messick, 1990; de Cremer, 2003; Rutte, Wilke, & 58 
Messick, 1987; van Dijk & Wilke, 1993, 1995; van Dijk, Wilke, Wilke, & Metman, 1999). 59 
Adhering to this rule results in a “fair” distribution, while violating such rule leads to anger 60 
and retribution (de Kwaadsteniet, van Dijk, Wit, & de Cremer, 2010).  61 
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Individuals differ concerning their preferences for equal outcomes. This individual 62 
difference is nicely illustrated by the concept of Social Value Orientation (SVO). SVO is a 63 
dispositional variable that depicts how people prefer certain outcomes of resource allocation 64 
for themselves and others (Messick & McClintock, 1968; van Lange, 1999). The majority of 65 
individuals could be identified as either prosocials or proselfs. Specifically, prosocials assign 66 
greater value to joint outcome maximization and equality among group members; proselfs 67 
assign greater value to personal gain. In the context of resource dilemmas, consistent findings 68 
demonstrate that prosocials harvest significantly less, thus deviate less from equal division, 69 
than do proselfs (Kramer, McClintock, & Messick, 1986; Parks, 1994; Roch & Samuelson, 70 
1997).  71 
Nonetheless, both prosocials and proselfs are able to follow the equality rule, for 72 
different reasons (e.g. van Dijk, de Cremer, & Handgraaf, 2004). A number of studies 73 
examining the contingencies of equality as a coordination rule suggest that prosocials 74 
consistently adhere to the equal division rule, whereas proselfs adhere to the equality rule only 75 
when they perceive resource size certainty (de Kwaadsteniet et al., 2006), have strong group 76 
identification (de Cremer, van Knippenberg, van Dijk, & van Leeuwen, 2008) or share a 77 
common understanding about the game (van Dijk, de Kwaadsteniet, & de Cremer, 2009). 78 
Stouten, de Cremer and van Dijk (2005) compared reactions of prosocials and proselfs towards 79 
a violator of equality and found that prosocials showed negative emotions towards the violator 80 
irrespective of failure or success of the group outcome. Proselfs, however, showed negative 81 
emotions towards the violator only when the group outcome turned out to be a failure. These 82 
results suggest that, prosocials adhere to the equality rule out of fairness concerns, whereas 83 
proselfs adhere to the equality rule out of efficiency concerns.  84 
The above literature points to the importance of revealing the cognitive underpinnings 85 
of prosocial decision making (for a review, see Zaki & Mitchell, 2013). In line with this notion, 86 
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the present research focuses on cognitive processes that impact individual harvest in resource 87 
dilemmas from a dual-process perspective. Dual-process theories propose that individual 88 
decisions are the products of two paralleling cognitive processing systems, namely intuition 89 
and deliberation. Compared with intuition, which is relatively automatic, fast, effortless, 90 
deliberation is more controlled, slower, effortful, and relies more heavily on cognitive 91 
resources (Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Sloman, 1996). Therefore, deliberation is 92 
more susceptible to cognitive-processing manipulations. Following this logic, if a decision 93 
results from true fairness concerns, it is unlikely to be affected by manipulations of cognitive 94 
processing. Alternatively, if the decision is camouflaged with strategic concerns, impeding 95 
deliberation is likely to change the decision.  96 
The social heuristic hypothesis (SHH; Rand et al., 2014) offers some important insights 97 
into the roles intuition and deliberation play in social interactions. The central argument of the 98 
SHH is that when individuals have learned social strategies that have been typically successful 99 
in daily life, these strategies become automatic, intuitive responses (e.g., Kiyonari, Tanida, & 100 
Yamagishi, 2000; Rand et al., 2014). Therefore, given prevalent mechanisms such as 101 
reciprocity, reputation, signaling, and punishment that facilitate cooperation (Axelrod & 102 
Hamilton, 1981; Fudenberg & Maskin, 1990; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; Jordan, Hoffman, 103 
Bloom, & Rand, 2016; van Veelen, García, Rand, & Nowak, 2012; Hoffman, Yoeli, & Nowak, 104 
2015), most people should be intuitively cooperative (for a review, see Rand & Nowak, 2013). 105 
Deliberation, however, can undermine intuitive responses and cause individuals to adopt other 106 
strategies that favor self-interest in specific decision contexts (Peysakhovich & Rand, 2015; 107 
Rand et al., 2014). This would generate two contrasting predictions concerning the role of 108 
deliberation. In decision contexts where there is no self-interested motive to cooperate, such as 109 
lack of future consequences or sanction, one should not cooperate from a perspective of self-110 
interest. Hence, deliberation is likely to adjust one’s behavior toward a more self-serving end. 111 
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In decision contexts where there is a self-interested motive to cooperate, say in the face of 112 
salient coordination rules or reputational concerns, deliberation should encourage cooperation. 113 
Results from a meta-analysis lend support to these hypotheses (Rand, 2016).  114 
The current research 115 
 Many prior experiments have examined intuition/deliberation in decision contexts 116 
where there is no self-interested motive to cooperate (for a review, see Rand, 2016). There has 117 
been substantially less work on situations where there is a self-interested motive for 118 
cooperation when considering individual difference moderators. We aim to fill this gap by 119 
comparing prosocial and proself individuals’ harvesting behavior in a one-shot resource 120 
dilemma.  121 
The self-interested motive for cooperation in a one-shot resource dilemma lies in the 122 
existence of a prominent coordination rule, namely equality. When all members adhere to the 123 
equality rule, they realize the optimal use of resources and achieve a perfect balance between 124 
personal and collective interest1 (de Kwaadsteniet et al., 2006). Therefore, deliberation is likely 125 
to favor equal division. Nonetheless, given consistent findings showing that prosocials and 126 
proselfs differ concerning their intuitions towards cooperation (Balliet & Joireman, 2010; 127 
Cornelissen, Dewitte, & Warlop, 2011), we suggest that the effect of deliberation on 128 
cooperation could be different for prosocials and for proselfs. Specifically, we expect that for 129 
prosocials, promoting deliberation would not change the level of cooperativeness, given that 130 
they adhere to the equality rule intuitively, and deliberation further corroborates with this 131 
decision. For proselfs, promoting deliberation would increase the level of cooperativeness, 132 
 
1  Many scholars argue that, compared with the prisoner’s dilemma, the coordination game could be more 
appropriate in understanding the resource dilemma (Baland & Platteau, 1996; Kollock, 1998; Ostrom, Gardner, 
Walker, & Walker, 1994). The coordination game, also known as the assurance game, is a social dilemma game 
in which the payoff for unilateral defection is lowered to the same payoff as for mutual cooperation, thus removing 
the temptation to free-ride. Compared with the prisoner’s dilemma, the coordination game generates incentives to 
cooperate. Cooperation is thus a personally rational choice, if one expects others to cooperate (for a review, see 
van Lange, Joireman, Parks, & van Dijk, 2013).  
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given that they make selfish responses intuitively, and deliberation adjust the decisions towards 133 
equal division.  134 
In this paper, we refer "strategic fairness" to equal share decisions made in a deliberative 135 
mode; we refer "true fairness" to equal share decisions made in an intuitive mode. In four 136 
experiments, we disentangle strategic fairness (van Dijk et al., 2004) from true fairness by 137 
manipulating individuals’ cognitive-processing modes using ego depletion,2 cognitive load, 138 
and thinking mode induction.  139 
Experiment 1 140 
Methods 141 
Participants 142 
A total of 115 undergraduates (75 men; average age 20.8 years; SD = 2.3 years) 143 
participated in with a reward of 50 HKD and a possible bonus from experimental tasks. 144 
Procedure and materials  145 
The experiment was conducted in a computer laboratory over several sessions. We 146 
framed the study as an investigation of color perception and decision making. When 147 
participants arrived at the lab, they were assigned to a computer. After signing a consent form, 148 
they completed a test measuring their SVO, followed by a 96-trial Stroop task (Wright, Stewart, 149 
& Barnett, 2008) which was used to manipulate ego-depletion. Then they engaged in three 150 
rounds of resource dilemma games. The experiment was a 2 (SVO: prosocial vs. proself) × 2 151 
(cognitive load: high vs. low) between-subjects design. 152 
SVO was measured by the triple dominance measure of social values (van Lange, de 153 
Bruin, Otten, & Joireman, 1997). In each of nine decomposed games, individuals chose among 154 
 
2 Ego depletion has been shown to alter the effects of intuitive and deliberative processing on behavior (for a 
review, see Hofmann, Friese, & Strack., 2009) by interfering with working memory and impairing cognitive and 
self-regulation capacities (Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004). Therefore, we consider it a valid method of 
manipulating cognitive processing. 	
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three outcome allocations between themselves and an imaginary partner. Each allocation 155 
indicated individualistic, competitive, or cooperative orientations. Following common 156 
practices, competitors and individualists were classified as proselfs (e.g., de Cremer & van 157 
Lange, 2001; de Dreu & van Lange, 1995; van Lange & Liebrand, 1991). Among the 115 158 
participants, 101 were classified as either proselfs (N = 45) or prosocials (N = 56). Participants 159 
were randomly assigned to a high (26 proselfs, 26 prosocials) and a low ego-depletion 160 
condition (19 proselfs, 30 prosocials). The other 14 participants could not be classified and 161 
were discarded from further analysis. 162 
To manipulate ego depletion, we had participants engage in a 96-trial Stroop color-163 
naming task (e.g., Bray, Martin Ginis, Hicks, & Woodgate, 2008; Webb & Sheeran, 2003). In 164 
each trial, a word printed in an incongruent color appeared at the center of the computer screen. 165 
For example, the word red was printed in blue. Participants were asked to press the S or L key 166 
randomly assigned to word meaning or ink color as quickly and accurately as possible. Half of 167 
the participants responded to word color as is typical in the Stroop task; the other half 168 
responded to word meaning. Given that responding to word meaning is more automatic and 169 
intuitive, responding to word color should tax more self-control resources and cause higher ego 170 
depletion (Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010). After participants completed the 171 
Stroop color-naming task, they completed a questionnaire assessing whether the ego-depletion 172 
test made them feel tired and whether it was difficult on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 173 
(not at all) to 7 (extremely). The two items served as our manipulation check of ego-depletion. 174 
After the color perception task, participants engaged in a series of one-shot resource 175 
dilemma games. They were told that they would play the games for several times with other 176 
participants in the same room anonymously and independently. Although each participant was 177 
told that in each round of game she/he would be randomly assigned to her/his position in a 178 
certain group, in reality each participant was assigned to the first position to make a request 179 
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without genuine grouping. The three common-resource dilemma games varied in pool size and 180 
group size: seven members shared 300 HKD; nine members shared 320 HKD; five members 181 
shared 258 HKD. The setup was actually a positional protocol that participants had to make 182 
decisions knowing their position only but not the amount that the others requested (Budescu, 183 
Suleiman, & Rapoport, 1995; Budescu, Au, & Chen, 1997). In the three games, participants 184 
were asked to make their individual request based on information concerning position, group 185 
size, and pool size. They were told that one participant in each experimental session, by 186 
drawing lots, would get a monetary bonus contingent on his/her performance in the decision 187 
tasks only if the total group requests did not exceed the pool size3. They were only allowed to 188 
type in integer numbers. Finally, participants were debriefed, paid, and dismissed. No 189 
participants showed suspicion that they were interacting with real group members.  190 
Results and discussion 191 
The ego-depletion manipulation was successful: participants in the high ego-depletion 192 
condition felt that the task was more difficult (M = 2.98 vs. 2.25) and laborious (M = 3.56 vs. 193 
2.68) than those in the low ego-depletion condition (ts ≥1.9, ps < .05). 194 
Internal consistency of the three individual requests was high (Cronbach’s alpha = .93). 195 
To eliminate the potential influence of pool size and group size on individual requests, the three 196 
individual requests were individually multiplied by a weight (i.e., the value of equal division 197 
in each round, 300/7, 320/9, 258/5) before summing to a single average value: relative 198 
individual request, with larger values indicating lower cooperativeness and 1 indicating a 199 
choice of equal division. A 2 (SVO: prosocial vs. proself) × 2 (ego depletion: high vs. low) 200 
ANOVA on individual requests yielded a significant main effect of SVO, F(1, 97) = 4.28, p 201 
 
3 At the end of each experimental session, an experimenter randomly chose one among the three resource dilemma 
games and provided participants with information regarding the success or failure of their requests in that game. 
Instead of receiving genuine feedback concerning their group performance, participants were provided with bogus 
feedback with a threshold of 100 HKD (roughly 1/3 of the pool size). That is, if the participant requested no more 
than 100 HKD, he/she received the actual amount of money requested as the extra bonus. Otherwise, the 
participant was informed that the group failed, and received no bonus. 
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< .05, ƞp2 = .041, suggesting that proselfs (M = 2.91, SD = 2.29) requested significantly more 202 
than did prosocials (M = 1.99, SD = 1.72).  203 
As expected, we found a significant SVO and ego-depletion two-way interaction effect 204 
(Figure 1), F(1, 97) = 5.15, p < .05, ƞp2 = .050. Simple main effect analyses showed that proselfs 205 
requested significantly more money in the high ego-depletion condition (M = 3.52, SD = .38) 206 
than in the low ego-depletion condition (M = 2.07, SD = .45), F(1, 97) = 6.05, p < .05, ƞp2 207 
= .059. Prosocials in the high ego-depletion condition (M = 1.81, SD = .38) and the low ego-208 
depletion condition (M = 2.15, SD = .36) did not make significantly different requests, F(1, 97) 209 
= .43, p > .05. These findings suggest that proselfs in the low ego-depletion condition were 210 
more cooperative than proselfs in the high ego-depletion condition. The manipulation had no 211 
effect on prosocials.  212 
 213 
 214 
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Experiment 2 220 
In Experiment 2, we manipulated cognitive-processing modes by asking participants to 221 
memorize and recall an eight-digit string of numbers, letters, and punctuation marks. Complex 222 
strings are expected to cause high cognitive load (Cornelissen et al., 2011). Consequently, we 223 
expected the task to sap cognitive resources necessary for working memory, leaving less 224 
cognitive ability to think deliberately. Participants in the high cognitive load condition would 225 
rely more on intuitive than deliberative processing to make decisions.  226 
Methods 227 
Participants  228 
A total of 87 undergraduates (63 women, average age = 20.8 years, SD = 1.6 years) 229 
participated in the experiment for 50 HKD and a possible bonus from experimental tasks.  230 
Procedure and materials 231 
As in Experiment 1, Experiment 2 was conducted in a computer laboratory over several 232 
sessions following identical procedures except that we manipulated cognitive-processing 233 
modes with a memorization task that has been confirmed by prior research (Cornelissen et al., 234 
2011).  235 
Participants first took the same test used in Study 1 to measure their SVO. As a result, 236 
78 of the 87 participants were classified as either prosocials (N = 37) or proselfs (N = 41) and 237 
were randomly assigned to high cognitive load (21 proselfs, 16 prosocials) and low cognitive 238 
load conditions (20 proselfs, 21 prosocials). The other nine participants could not be classified 239 
and were eliminated from further analysis.  240 
Then participants were informed that they would be required to recall a string of 241 
numbers, letters, and punctuation marks that appeared on their computer screen for 8 seconds. 242 
Participants in the high cognitive load condition memorized a complex string: “6!w9z8*4.” 243 
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Participants in the low cognitive load condition memorized a simpler string: “908070@t.” They 244 
were expected to rehearse the eight-digit string throughout the decision tasks.  245 
Next, participants proceeded to the decision tasks—the three resource dilemma games. 246 
Finally, they were asked to recall the eight-digit string. Participants reported whether the 247 
memory task was difficult and whether it interfered with the decision tasks, on a 7-point scale 248 
from 1 (not at all) to 7(extremely). The experiment was a 2 (SVO: prosocial, proself) × 2 249 
(cognitive load: high, low) between-subjects design. 250 
Finally, after completing their demographic information, participants were debriefed, 251 
paid, and dismissed. 252 
Results and discussion 253 
Participants in the high cognitive load condition perceived the memory task to be 254 
significantly more difficult (M = 4.46 vs. M = 2.48, t(85) = 5.55, p < .001) and more interfering 255 
(M = 3.63 vs. M = 2.22, t(85) = 3.96, p < .001) than those in the low cognitive load condition, 256 
suggesting that our cognitive load manipulation was successful.  257 
As in Experiment 1, we averaged relative individual requests in the three common-258 
resource dilemma games as the behavioral indicator, with larger value indicating lower 259 
cooperativeness (Cronbach’s alpha = .92). We conducted a 2 (SVO) × 2 (cognitive load) 260 
ANOVA on relative individual requests. We found a significant main effect of SVO, F(1, 74) 261 
= 12.45, p < .01, ƞp2 = .14: proselfs requested significantly larger amounts of money (M = 2.84, 262 
SD = 2.32) than prosocials requested (M = 1.41, SD = 1.02).  263 
More importantly, we found a significant SVO and cognitive load two-way interaction 264 
effect (Figure 2), F(1, 74) = 4.05, p < .05, ƞp2 = .052. Simple main effect analyses showed that 265 
proselfs in the high cognitive load condition (M = 3.61, SD = 2.57) requested significantly 266 
more money than did proselfs in the low cognitive load condition (M = 2.02, SD = 1.74), F(1, 267 
74) = 8.42, p < .01, ƞp2 = .10; but prosocials in the high cognitive load condition (M = 1.40, SD 268 
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= .66) and the low cognitive load condition (M = 1.42, SD = 1.24) made similar requests, F(1, 269 
74) = .001, p >.05.  270 
 271 
Figure 2. Relative individual requests as a function of cognitive load and social value 272 
orientation. 273 
 274 
In Experiment 2, we used cognitive load to manipulate cognitive-processing modes and 275 
further revealed that SVO moderated the relationship between cognitive processing and 276 
cooperation in resource dilemma games. We found that taxing cognitive resources produced 277 
effects similar to the effects of the ego-depletion manipulation. Our findings indicated that ego 278 
depletion and cognitive load have parallel effects on cooperative behavior.  279 
Experiment 3 280 
In Experiments 1 and 2, cognitive-processing modes were manipulated through tasks 281 
that effectively interfered with deliberative processing. Drawing on the resource-demanding 282 
nature of deliberation, these two experiments consistently showed that deliberation promoted 283 
cooperation in proselfs, but it had no effect in prosocials. In Experiment 3, we manipulated 284 
cognitive-processing modes by instructing participants to make decisions based on intuition or 285 
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prior research (Ferreira, Garcia-Marques, Sherman, & Sherman, 2006). Compared with the 287 
intuitive instruction, the deliberative instruction should increase one’s reliance on deliberation. 288 
The instructions should have no impact on intuition, which is automatic and unaffected by 289 
goals (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Sherman & Corty, 1984).  290 
Methods 291 
Participants 292 
A total of 87 students (57 women, average age = 20.2 years, SD = 1.3 years) participated 293 
in the experiment for 50 HKD and a possible bonus from experimental tasks. Students that 294 
participated in the first and the second experiment were filtered out by student ID. 295 
Procedure and materials 296 
The procedure was identical to that in Experiments 1 and 2, except we manipulated 297 
thinking styles. Eighty participants were classified as either prosocials (N = 43) or proselfs (N 298 
= 37). They were then randomly assigned to either the intuitive thinking (20 proselfs, 21 299 
prosocials) or the deliberative thinking condition (17 proselfs, 22 prosocials). The other seven 300 
participants could not be classified and were discarded from further analysis.  301 
Participants were instructed to use either intuitive or deliberative thinking in making 302 
decisions in three resource dilemma games. The experiment was a 2 (SVO: prosocial, proself) 303 
× 2 (thinking modes: intuitive, deliberative) between-subjects design.  304 
To induce intuitive and deliberate thinking styles, we followed prior research (Ferreira 305 
et al., 2006; Usher, Russo, Weyers, Brauner, & Zakay, 2011) by asking participants to try to 306 
avoid their habitual thinking patterns and to think either intuitively or deliberately. In the 307 
intuitive thinking condition, participants were instructed to use their first hunch in determining 308 
how much money they would request; in the deliberative thinking condition, they were told to 309 
rationally and logically decide how much money they would request by fully utilizing available 310 
information. After the decision tasks, participants reported how extensively they followed 311 
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instructions and whether they based their decisions on deliberative or intuitive thinking, on a 312 
5-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). 313 
Results and discussion 314 
Participants in the intuitive thinking condition reported higher levels of intuitive 315 
thinking than did those in the deliberative thinking condition (M = 3.80 vs. M = 3.21, t(85) = 316 
2.32, p < .05). Similarly, participants in the intuitive thinking condition reported lower levels 317 
of deliberative thinking than did those in the deliberative thinking condition (M = 3.30 vs. M 318 
= 3.81, t(85) = 2.28, p = .09). The two groups were not significantly different in terms of how 319 
extensively they followed instructions (p = .14). These results suggest that thinking styles were 320 
successfully induced. 321 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, we averaged relative individual requests in the three rounds 322 
of resource dilemma games as the behavioral indicator, with larger numbers indicating lower 323 
cooperativeness (Cronbach’s alpha = .94). We conducted a 2 (SVO) × 2 (thinking mode) 324 
ANOVA on relative individual requests. We found a significant main effect of SVO, F(1, 76) 325 
= 10.83, p < .01, ƞp2 = .13, as proselfs requested more money for themselves (M = 2.56, SD = 326 
1.81) than did prosocials (M = 1.43, SD = 1.18).  327 
As expected, we found a significant SVO and thinking mode two-way interaction effect 328 
(Figure 3), F(1, 76) = 4.34, p < .05, ƞp2 = .054. Simple main effect analyses showed that proselfs 329 
requested significantly more money when they thought intuitively (M = 3.03, SD = 2.04) than 330 
when they thought deliberatively (M = 2.00, SD = 1.35; F(1, 76) = 4.54, p < .05, ƞp2 = .056). 331 
Prosocials’ requests in the two conditions did not differ significantly (M = 1.25 SD = .44 vs. M 332 
= 1.59, SD = 1.60, F(1, 76) = .58, p > .05).  333 
 334 
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 335 
Figure 3. Relative individual requests as a function of processing mode and social value 336 
orientation. 337 
 338 
The findings suggest that deliberative thinking can make proselfs become more 339 
cooperative, but has no effect on prosocials. Thus our results in Experiment 3 are consistent 340 
with findings in Experiments 1 and 2. Moreover, Experiment 3 confirms that the effects of 341 
thinking mode induction echoed the effects of ego depletion and cognitive load in influencing 342 
cooperation.  343 
Experiment 4 344 
To check the robustness of the above findings, we conducted an additional pre-345 
registered study to replicate Experiment 1.4 346 
Methods 347 
Participants 348 
Given that effect size f in Experiments 1-3 ranges from .24 to .33, we assume an effect 349 
size of .25 in the pre-registered study. Therefore, we recruited 236 undergraduates (161 women, 350 
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average age = 20.7 years, SD = 3.5) to participate in this experiment in exchange for 60 HKD 351 
and a possible bonus from experimental tasks.  352 
Procedure and materials  353 
The materials and procedure were identical to those used in Experiment 1.  354 
Results and discussion 355 
Among the 236 participants, 216 were classified as proselfs (N = 82) or prosocials (N 356 
= 134). Participants were randomly assigned to either a high (36 proselfs, 72 prosocials) or a 357 
low ego-depletion condition (46 proselfs, 62 prosocials). The other 20 participants could not 358 
be classified and were discarded from further analysis. 359 
In the high ego-depletion condition, participants rated the task as more difficult (M = 360 
2.65 vs. 2.10), and more laborious (M = 3.72 vs. 3.22) than in the low ego-depletion condition 361 
(ts ≥ 2.3, ps < .05), suggesting an effective ego-depletion manipulation.  362 
Following the same procedures, we then averaged the relative requests in the three trials 363 
as the behavioral indicator (Cronbach’s alpha = .95), with 1 indicating equal division, and larger 364 
numbers indicating lower cooperativeness. A 2 (SVO) × 2 (ego depletion) ANOVA on mean 365 
relative request yielded a significant main effect of SVO, F(1, 212) = 8.75, p < .01, ƞp2 = .040, 366 
suggesting that proselfs (M = 1.74, SD = 1.47) requested significantly more money than did 367 
prosocials (M = 1.31, SD = .94). Ego depletion also had a main effect, F(1, 212) = 6.44, p < .05, 368 
ƞp2 = .029, suggesting that participants requested significantly more money in the high ego-369 
depletion condition (M = 1.62, SD = 1.37) than in the low ego-depletion condition (M = 1.32, 370 
SD = .96). 371 
The expected SVO and ego-depletion interaction was marginally significant, F(1, 212) 372 
= 3.32, p = .070, ƞp2 = .0155. Simple main effect analyses showed that, as expected, proselfs 373 
 
5 Excluding four participants that failed to pass the 50% accuracy in the Stroop task led to similar result: F(1, 208) 
= 3.39, p = .067, ƞp2 = .016. 
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requested significantly more money in the high ego-depletion condition (M = 2.14, SD = 1.77) 374 
than in the low ego-depletion condition (M = 1.43, SD = 1.11), F(1, 212) = 7.64, p < .01, ƞp2 375 
= .035. Prosocials in the high ego-depletion condition (M = 1.36, SD = 1.03) and the low ego-376 
depletion condition (M = 1.25, SD = .83) made similar requests, F(1, 212) = .34, p > .05.  377 
 378 
Figure 4. Relative individual requests as a function of ego depletion and social value 379 
orientation. 380 
 381 
Although the expected interaction was not significant at a .05 level, the pattern found 382 
in Experiment 4 is consistent with the previous three experiments. We speculate that although 383 
the sample size in this study is sufficient to test a medium-sized effect as indicated by G*power, 384 
its statistical power may fall short of a smaller effect. Therefore we conducted a meta-analysis 385 
based on findings of all four experiments to more accurately evaluate the effective size of our 386 
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Meta-analysis 393 
Methods 394 
To determine the effect size of the interaction effect between SVO and cognitive-395 
processing manipulation, we used the formula6 by Rand (2016) to calculate the effect size for 396 
the simple effect of cognitive-processing manipulations on relative individual requests by 397 
prosocials and proselfs respectively. Table 1 shows a summary for effect sizes in the four 398 
studies. We performed a random-effects meta-analysis in SPSS using the syntax on effect size 399 
expressed as d (Meta_Basic_d.sps) recommended by Field and Gillett (2009; 2010).  400 
 401 
Table 1. Summary for effect size 402 
  n1 n2 d 
Proself  
Study 1 26 19 0.700 
Study 2 21 20 0.787 
Study 3 20 21 0.515 
Study 4 36 46 0.497 
Prosocial  
Study 1 26 30 -0.158 
Study 2 16 21 -0.014 
Study 3 17 22 -0.213 
Study 4 72 62 0.088 
 403 
Results and discussion:  404 
As expected, the meta-analysis showed a highly significant negative overall effect of 405 
increased intuitive processing on relative individual requests for proselfs, effect size = 59.9 406 
percentage points, 95% confidence interval (CI) = [32.0, 87.8], z = 4.21, p < .0001. No evidence 407 
was found for a significant overall effect of increased intuitive processing on relative individual 408 
requests for prosocials: effect size = -2.2 percentage points, 95% confidence interval (CI) = [-409 
26.3, 22.0], z = .18, p = .86. These estimates confirm strategic fairness in individuals with a 410 
proself value orientation but not in individuals with a prosocial value orientation.  411 
 
6 d = (Rintuition - R deliberation)/Rdeliberation. Larger relative individual requests indicate lower cooperativeness, so the d 
here denotes percentage change associated with increased intuition, with larger ds indicating lower 
cooperativeness.  
                                                                                                                                                                                            20 
General discussion 412 
How can we determine whether individuals adhere to the equality rule out of a strategic 413 
concern or a true concern for fairness? The current research attempts to answer this question 414 
from the dual-process perspective. In a situation that involves self-interested motive to 415 
cooperate, namely a one-shot resource dilemma, we compared the effects of cognitive 416 
processing manipulations on harvesting behavior of people with different SVO. Through four 417 
studies and a meta-analysis, our results consistently showed that SVO moderated the 418 
relationship between processing mode (intuitive versus deliberative) and cooperation. 419 
Specifically, proselfs generally requested less money from the resource pool when making 420 
decisions in a deliberative mode than in an intuitive mode, suggesting that their concern for 421 
fairness is strategic. Prosocials made similar requests in both conditions, suggesting a tendency 422 
to follow the equality rule intuitively. 423 
 In responding to Rand et al.’s (2016) proposal that understanding cognitive 424 
underpinnings of prosocial decision making requires further inquiries into individual 425 
differences, we showed, for the first time, that while cognitive processing manipulations had 426 
little effect on prosocials, deliberative processing substantially promoted cooperation among 427 
proselfs. This finding fits well with the predictions of a recent mathematical model based on 428 
the social heuristics hypothesis (Bear, Kagan, & Rand, 2017; Bear & Rand 2016), arguing that 429 
people who develop their strategies in a context that strongly supports cooperation (i.e., 430 
prosocials) may intuitively cooperate. Therefore, in the context where there is a self-interested 431 
motive to cooperate, they cooperate regardless of whether they use intuition or deliberation. 432 
Conversely, people who develop their strategies in a context that is less supportive of 433 
cooperation (i.e., proselfs) may intuitively defect. However, when they deliberate and realize 434 
their personal goals has to be attained through collective goals, they become more cooperative.  435 
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Similar to Rand (2016), Bogaert, Boone, and Declerck (2008) discussed factors that 436 
moderate the relation between SVO and cooperative behavior. One factor of particular 437 
relevance to our study, is the “extrinsic incentives to cooperate” signaling that a cooperative 438 
action will be more beneficial than a self-interested action. Such contextual cues indicate that 439 
personal goals may be aligned with collective goals. For example, in our case, individual goals 440 
to harvest successfully from the common-resource pool are aligned with the collective goal to 441 
make optimal use of the common-resource pool. In such contexts, prosocials would not change 442 
their behavior because they already assign a higher weight to collective outcomes, by default. 443 
However, extrinsic incentives would motivate proselfs to cooperate. We validated and extended 444 
those propositions by showing that proselfs were motivated to cooperate only when they were 445 
prompted to use deliberation rather than intuition. This finding is also consistent with 446 
neuroimaging research showing that cooperative behavior of proselfs is highly reliant on a 447 
cognitive control system that processes extrinsic cooperative incentives (Declerck, Boone, & 448 
Emonds, 2013).  449 
The present research contributes to the coordination literature by showing that while 450 
coordination is a built-in module of prosocials, successful coordination of proselfs relies 451 
heavily on deliberation. This is consistent with previous research showing that prosocials 452 
spontaneously coordinate with others, by synchronizing with the movement of an interactive 453 
partner, to a greater extent than do proselfs (Lumsden, Miles, Richardson, Smith, & Macrae, 454 
2012). These results highlight the importance of deliberation for proselfs, such that they are 455 
only able to realize the coordination nature of a game when they are prompted to "think". This 456 
also implies that they are more prone to egocentric biases that hinder coordination. Similarly, 457 
literature in negotiation concludes that proselfs draw to their egocentric tendencies that result 458 
in poorer joint outcomes (de Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000), whereas prosocials stick to 459 
equality, consensus, and joint gain that facilitate negotiation success (Bazerman, Curhan, 460 
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Moore, & Valley, 2000; de Dreu, 2004; Pruitt, 1981). Our results qualified this finding by 461 
showing that this is especially the case, when individuals are prompted to use intuition. 462 
In addition, the current study showed that individual requests consistently deviated 463 
from an equal division, and this was the case even for prosocials. We suggest that this could be 464 
due to positional advantage in the scenarios. Being the "first" in the sequence to make a request 465 
has been shown to decrease cooperation (Abele & Ehrhart, 2005; Au & Ngai, 2003; Budescu 466 
et al., 1997). Our findings highlight the importance of contextual cues in influencing decision-467 
making in social dilemmas.   468 
The current research has several limitations. First, we adopted resource dilemma games 469 
varied in group size and pool size without counterbalancing order of the games. Prior research 470 
has shown that both group size and pool size could affect individual decisions in social 471 
dilemmas (Allison & Messick, 1990; Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Isaac & Walker, 1988; Oliver 472 
& Marwell, 1988; Marwell & Ames, 1979). Although we computed the weighted average of 473 
individual requests across the three trials (Cronbach’s alphas > .92) to eliminate potential 474 
influence of the group size and the pool size, we still could not rule out the possibility of a 475 
sequence effect. Second, we did not include a control group compared with our manipulation 476 
groups. Apparently, even low ego-depletion and low cognitive load conditions still involve 477 
cognition-consuming tasks. For instance, participants in Experiment 2 were asked to memorize 478 
and rehearse a simple string “908070@t” throughout the decision tasks. Such simple job could 479 
still interfere with deliberation. Therefore, future research should include a control condition 480 
in which no cognitive load/ego depletion is induced. In doing so, we would be able to observe 481 
how participants make decisions when deliberation remains intact. Third, in the current study, 482 
we did not use real grouping, which might limit external validity of our conclusion. Therefore, 483 
further study is needed to investigate the impact of individual decisions on collective efficiency 484 
in a "real" resource dilemma. 485 
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These findings provide the following insights for future research. Although many 486 
studies support predictive validity of SVO as a trait-level preference in social dilemma settings 487 
(e.g., Au & Kwong, 2004; Balliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009; Bogaert et al., 2008; van Lange, 488 
de Cremer, van Dijk, & van Vugt, 2007), others argue that SVO measures are susceptible to 489 
deliberation and computation (Balliet & Joireman, 2010), self-presentation (Iedema & Poppe, 490 
1994) and question framing (de Dreu & McCusker, 1997). Therefore, designing a subtler 491 
measurement, such as using the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 492 
1998), to scrutinize implicit social preferences could potentially complement the current SVO 493 
measurements. In addition, given that affect can influence people’s executive functioning (for 494 
a review, see Mitchell & Phillips, 2007), it is reasonable to expect that affect could mediate the 495 
effect of cognitive processing manipulations on cooperative decisions. Some researchers 496 
showed that cognitive control depletion did not give rise to changes in affect that could have 497 
meditated the effect of manipulations on decision tasks (e.g., Balliet & Joireman, 2010; Bieleke, 498 
Gollwitzer, Oettingen, & Fischbacher, 2017; Stucke & Baumeister, 2006; Vohs et al., 2008; Xu, 499 
Bègue, & Bushman, 2012), while a recent meta-analysis showed a significant effect size on 500 
negative affect (Hagger et al., 2010). Therefore, future investigation is needed to provide more 501 
empirical evidence regarding the role of affect in people’s decisions in social dilemmas. Finally, 502 
although it seems that prosocials are less affected by external incentives to cooperate, this does 503 
not mean that they are not sensitive to decision contexts (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Declerck et 504 
al., 2013). For instance, prosocials are found to be more responsive to cues that signal 505 
trustworthiness (for a review, see Bogaert et al., 2008). Therefore, more systematic research 506 
concerning the interplay of social values and contextual influence is needed to enrich 507 
understanding of cooperation, coordination, and negotiation.  508 
509 
                                                                                                                                                                                            24 
Appendix: Instructions for the decision tasks 510 
 Imagine your group has won a monetary bonus from a lucky draw. Each group member 511 
can request some money from this monetary pool. Specifically, in each round you will read 512 
information regarding the pool size and group size, your sequence of request, and you will then 513 
decide the amount of money you would like to take from the monetary pool. You will be 514 
randomly grouped with other participants in this room, and complete the task for several times. 515 
The sequence of making requests is randomized and all group members’ requests will be kept 516 
confidential. 517 
Important Note 518 
 Below is information concerning the contingencies upon which you will and will not 519 
be able to get an extra bonus. 520 
 1. The amount of bonus you could get will be determined by two lucky draws conducted 521 
by the end of this experiment. The first lucky draw determines which one participant will get 522 
an extra bonus. The second lucky draw determines which round of tasks of that lucky person 523 
will be considered.  524 
 2. Whether the lucky person will get a bonus is contingent upon the total requests in 525 
his/her group in that round. He/she will get what he requested in that round only if the sum of 526 
his group would not exceed the bonus size (i.e. a successful allocation). Otherwise, he/she 527 
won’t get the bonus.  528 
 529 
 Once participants click “I understand the rules of decisions, the decision tasks begin”, 530 
they proceed to the next screen page, SHOWING “Grouping, please wait” for a few 531 
seconds. Then on the next screen, participants read the following information: 532 
 533 
"There are SEVEN members in your group 534 
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Your group receives a bonus of 300 HKD 535 
You are the first to make a request" 536 
 537 
 "The amount of money you request from the monetary pool (in integer): _____HKD." 538 
 After they submit their request, they proceed to the next screen page, SHOWING 539 
“Grouping, please wait” for a few seconds. And then the next decision task begins. 540 
 541 
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